社区体育开展的理论依据与现状

社区体育发展理论与实践不仅关系到人们身体健康大事,更关系到和谐社会的大事。随着我国城市化进程的加快,我国社区体育无论从理论还是实践都有较大的发展,但还有许多不足之处,正确认识我国社区体育现状有利于其更加健康的发展。     

基于案件模糊推理的试验装备采办风险控制研究

如何运用科学的手段选择正确的风险控制策略,是试验装备采办风险控制是否成功的关键和基础。针对试验装备采办风险控制进行了研究,分析了试验装备采办风险控制策略,建立了基于案例模糊推理的试验装备采办风险策略选择模型,研究结论有利于更好地识别和规避试验装备采办风险,提高试验装备采办效率。     

灰色理论和模糊数学相结合的装备保障能力评估模型

军事装备保障能力的评估研究.对于战斗力的形成和保持有着重要意义.以灰色理论和模糊数学为基础,提出了一种新的装备保障能力评估模型,它是由AHP、灰色聚类分析,模糊评判综合集成而成的,既能体现装备保障能力评估的模糊性,又能充分利用信息,避免了使用单一模糊数学方法的不合理之处,为全面系统评估军事装备保障能力提供了一种新的途径.     

有顶商业步行街消防设计研究

根据我国有顶步行商业街建筑或建筑群的建设和使用现状，研究有顶步行商业街的实际火灾危险性，针对防火设计方面存在的难点，对平面布置、顶棚构件、防火分隔、消防设施等设计要求进行了分析研究，并提出了防火设计措施。     

武器装备一体化试验鉴定中两类风险管理

在制定武器装备试验鉴定方案时,厂家和部队双方很难协调生产方风险α、使用方风险β和试验成本之间相矛盾的问题。提出的一体化试验鉴定方法,引用F分布构造的统计量,根据试验具有继承性的特点,充分结合先验数据与现场试验数据对产品进行鉴定,证明了2类风险α、β与现场数据样本量n、先验数据样本量m等参数间的内在联系,运用MATLAB软件计算出一体化试验鉴定方法对应的各参数间量化数值表。     

装备采办风险管理风险源分析

装备采办各个阶段都存在着不确定的因素,为加强风险管理,重点研究了在武器装备采办过程中可能出现的13个风险区域,并对各个风险区域可能出现的风险源进行了较为详细的分析。同时详细研究了辨识风险的4种方法,即基于工作分解结构的风险辨识方法、基于项目评审的风险辨识方法、基于费用分析的风险辨识方法和基于试验与评价的风险辨识方法。     

建构主义教学论与教学模式改革

建构主义学习观强调学习的建构性、社会性和情境性 ,对促进教学方法的变革将有重要意义。文章运用建构教学观辨证分析了传统教学模式 ,综合现代以知识为中心、以学生为中心和行为主义理论等现代教育思想 ,分析了传授———建构教学法、合作、探究学习方法。     

强化军人精神支柱的途径

在新形势下 ,围绕“打得赢、不变质”两个历史性课题 ,强化精神支柱 ,坚定理想信念 ,应努力建设良好的政治环境 ,以正确的思想理论、昂扬的革命精神和严格的组织纪律来教育、激励和约束官兵 ,不断强化军人精神支柱。     

Ordering and controlling the dimensions of strategy

Colin Gray’s dimensions of strategy, built upon the earlier work of Clausewitz and Howard, has theoretical, practical, and pedagogic value for the Strategic Studies community. This paper further develops the theory, arguing that the dimensions can be controlled or managed to improve strategic performance. The dimensions are divided into two categories: “internal” and “external” to the process of strategy. The paper describes the dynamic process by which the internal dimensions, which can be controlled, are used to exert influence over the external dimensions that are beyond the control of the strategist. It is argued that six dimensions hold the key to strategic success: politics and the five dimensions concerned with warfighting. This conclusion validates the Clausewitzian paradigm with its emphasis on policy and battle.     

Timely exposure of a secret project: Which activities to monitor?

A defender wants to detect as quickly as possible whether some attacker is secretly conducting a project that could harm the defender. Security services, for example, need to expose a terrorist plot in time to prevent it. The attacker, in turn, schedules his activities so as to remain undiscovered as long as possible. One pressing question for the defender is: which of the project's activities to focus intelligence efforts on? We model the situation as a zero‐sum game, establish that a late‐start schedule defines a dominant attacker strategy, and describe a dynamic program that yields a Nash equilibrium for the zero‐sum game. Through an innovative use of cooperative game theory, we measure the harm reduction thanks to each activity's intelligence effort, obtain insight into what makes intelligence effort more effective, and show how to identify opportunities for further harm reduction. We use a detailed example of a nuclear weapons development project to demonstrate how a careful trade‐off between time and ease of detection can reduce the harm significantly.